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Lack of entrepreneurial management leads to failure of social enterprise governed by an 
institutional partnership 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reports an on-going research study that is investigating the application of a model of 
team-based philosophy to test the efficacy of an ‘institutional partnership’ between a UK 
university (UNI) and a regional social enterprise development agency (SEDA) as they seek to 
set-up and develop a work-integration social enterprise (WISE). The research design is 
longitudinal, conducted over a period of 18 months and has three data collection phases ‘early’, 
‘middle’ and ‘late’. This paper reports the analysis of data gathered during the ‘late’ phase of 
this research. Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 participants 
involved in the partnership organisations and the WISE programme delivery staff. Qualitative 
analysis of the interview data revealed five emergent themes, which were subsequently 
interpreted by the researchers as: ‘Reasons’, ‘Positives’, ‘Company structure’, ‘The 
Partnership’ and ‘Negatives’. The theme ‘Reasons’ revealed the participant’s perceptions of why 
the Partnership and the company failed to achieve their original aspirations. The theme 
‘Positives’ was characterised by the notion that the funded project was an ‘experiment’, which 
produced a learning outcome. The ‘experiment’ was to test the viability of a funding body 
supporting the creation of an institutional partnership to set-up and develop a WISE. It was 
interesting to note an important distinction made by one of the participants who proposed that 
what was tested was the ability of the individuals representing the organisations rather than the 
organisations per se. The theme ‘Company structure’ highlighted the negative effects on the 
Partnership created by the volatile nature of the company structure during this ‘late’ phase. 
Changes in personnel, roles and responsibilities at all levels created an unstable environment 
and context, which impacted negatively on the Partnership and the company. The theme ‘The 
Partnership’ revealed the impact of a dispute between the partners that was rooted in a change 
of CEO at one of the partnership organisations. The theme ‘Negatives’ highlighted personal 
feelings of failure and responsibility for that failure. Failure was perceived as a failure of the 
‘experiment’ by some participants others perceived failure in a more personal sense. The results 
of the analysis of the data from this ‘late’ phase, when compared to criteria from the adopted 
team-based model, suggests that the partnership and WISE staff failed to metamorphose into an 
‘effective team’. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the late phase of a three-phase longitudinal research study designed to 
examine the formation and development of a partnership between a UK regional social enterprise 
development agency (hitherto referred to as SEDA) and a UK University (hitherto referred to as 
UNI). The partnership was formed in order to set-up a work-integration social enterprise (WISE) 
with the support of grant funding and to test the notion of developing a financially sustainable 
WISE from a ‘funded project’. Work on the set-up of the WISE began during the early part of 
2008 and resulted in a bid for funding being submitted by SEDA to a funding body in August 
2009. The funding bid was successful and the partnership between SEDA and UNI was formed, 
which ultimately led to the set-up of the WISE that began trading in March 2010. The 
management structure of the WISE consisted of a board of directors, a steering group, CEO and 
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company staff who administered and delivered three employment enhancement programmes to 
clients according to their age, qualification and prior experience. Client groups were young 
people not involved in employment education or training (NEET), unemployed graduates, and 
unemployed ‘executives’. Members of the partnership between SEDA and UNI and the WISE 
staff were considered to be a ‘team’ collaborating to fulfill the monitoring requirements of the 
funding body in terms of delivering a funded project and creating income from trading to ensure 
the continuing financial sustainability of the WISE. In order to provide empirical evidence of the 
success of this ‘team’ venture the researchers reviewed team building literature. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Prior research conducted by Tuckman (1965) established a four stage, team-development model, 
based on four stages: forming, storming, norming and performing. Tuckman (1965) proposed 
that passing through this four stage process transformed a loose group into an effective team. 
Later research, Adair (1986), which examined group formation, postulated that groups of 
individuals share common needs that can be categorised into three basic elements (i.e. task, 
group and individual). Sheard & Kakabadse (2002) added a fourth basic element to the list of 
common needs (i.e. environment) based on the importance of organisation culture rooted in 
associated norms, routines and rituals. Sheard & Kakabadse (2002) argued that for a loose group 
to successfully transform into an effective team through the process of forming, storming, 
norming and performing, all four basic elements: task, group, individual and environment must 
be aligned. This alignment of the basic elements between individuals requires the management of 
any conflict in order to minimise negative impacts on the team. The developing nature of the 
management of conflict means that alignment of all the basic elements does not occur until the 
final stage (i.e. performing), which means during forming, storming and norming stages, 
alignment of the basic elements does not occur. Alignment of the basic elements evolves in three 
‘states’, which can be assigned to each basic element at each stage of the team development 
process (Sheard & Kakabadse, 2002). These three ‘states’ are: 
 
(1) understanding and acceptance of issues associated with the basic element by team 
members; 
(2)  acceptance and understanding of issues associated with the basic element by some 
team members; 
(3) non-shared assumptions about issues associated with the basic element by team 
members. 
 
It is the alignment of the basic elements of task, group, individual and environment, as indicated 
by state (1) above, that signals the team’s arrival at the performing stage of team development 
(See Fig.1). 
 
Sheard & Kakabadse (2002) extended the integrated team development framework by adding a 
‘forming opt out’ and a ‘norming/storming cycle’ to the original Tuckman (1965) forming, 
storming, norming and performing team development model (see Fig.1). The ‘forming opt out’ is 
taken by individuals who do not immediately enter the storming phase. The ‘norming/storming 
cycle’ is taken by individuals who do not progress to the performing stage. Deviation from the 
Tuckman (1965) direct route is because individuals are not prepared to accept decisions that 
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would involve them in doing something differently and prefer to retreat into denial. It is essential 
for key individuals in the team to ‘buy in’ to what the team is attempting to accomplish in order 
for the team to reach the performing stage. If non-key individuals do not ‘buy in’ to what the 
team is attempting to accomplish, this won’t necessarily prevent the team reaching the 
performing stage however greater efforts will be required from the others who do ‘buy in’ or the 
team will not perform as well as it could have done. However, without the support of key 
individuals the team will remain in the norming/storming cycle and fail to reach the performing 
stage.  
 
Figure 1: The integrated team development framework (Sheard & Kakabadse, 2002:137) 
 
 
 
In order to apply the above framework to determining the stage of development a team has 
reached, the basic elements of task, individual, group and environment were broken down into 
nine key factors that collectively differentiate a loose group from an effective team (Sheard & 
Kakabadse, 2002).  
 
To transform a loose group into an effective team requires a task for them to engage in. A task 
requires a goal, which must be clearly articulated to the group. Also, because in any organisation 
there will be constraints of time, money and available resources, a set of priorities around the 
task must also be clearly articulated. An individual must be considered as a team member, which 
relates to roles and responsibilities within the team and the extent of self-awareness of the 
consequences of one’s actions and behaviours on other team members. The group refers to the 
team’s ability to function as a unit, which can be broken down into three key factors: leadership, 
group dynamics and communication. Environment is defined by infrastructure and organisational 
context where infrastructure encompasses: IT systems, HR support and the ability of senior 
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management to translate its strategy into a series of goals suitable for the teams to tackle and 
context is the organisation of the company. 
 
Table 1: The nine key factors (adapted from Sheard & Kakabadse, 2002, P. 137) 
 
Basic element Key factor Loose group Effective teams  
     
Task Clearly defined goals Individuals opt out of goals not 
understood 
Understood by all  
 Priorities Split loyalty of individuals to 
other groups 
Cohesive team alignment  
Individual Roles and 
responsibilities 
Unclear, with gaps and overlap Agreed and understood by 
individuals 
 
 Self-awareness Individuals guarded Social system established and 
accepted 
 
Group Leadership Directive Catalytic  
 Group dynamics Individuals guarded Social system established and 
accepted 
 
 Communications Formal Open dialogue  
Environment Infrastructure Task focused Stable support from 
organizational infrastructure 
 
 Context Task focused Influenced, but not controlled 
by organisation 
 
 
It is proposed in the current research-evaluation that elicitation of participant perception of these 
nine key factors will reveal the stage the partnership has reached in becoming an effective team 
in this ‘late’ phase of development. For the purposes of the current research evaluation, the 
‘partnership’ refers to the collection of organisations (i.e. SEDA and UNI) collaborating in the 
project, which is being delivered largely by the WISE.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
The total number of participants was ten, (N=10) which consisted of, four of the six members of 
the WISE board of directors (two of the SEDA directors were unavailable for interview 
purposes) (n=4), the three WISE steering group members who are not also board members (n=3) 
and the three administration and programme delivery staff (n=3). The board of directors 
represented the two main partners and consisted of 3 representatives from UNI and 3 
representatives from SEDA (one of whom was the chairperson and resigned due to health 
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problems). The steering group was made up of representatives of the partners (i.e. SEDA, and 
UNI) and additional co-opted stakeholders. From time-to-time, members of the steering group 
were seconded to the WISE administration and delivery programmes. At the time of data 
collection for this ‘late’ phase, there were three members of staff: one involved with 
administration, one business development officer (BDO) and one youth development coordinator 
(YDC) (for clarification of the partnership structure, please see Fig. 2 below).  
 
During the period of this ‘late’ phase (May 2011 – October 2011) the Agency Manager resigned 
and was not replaced, the Chair of the board (A SEDA representative) also resigned and one of 
the remaining two SEDA directors became the new Chair of the WISE board. The effects of 
these changes to the structure of the WISE can be seen in Figure 2 (See Figure 2). The change in 
the number of participants interviewed during this ‘late’ phase, from 15 participants in the 
‘middle’ phase to 10 participants in this ‘late’ phase, resulted from individuals leaving the 
company and one individual who declined to be interviewed. These individuals were the Chair of 
the WISE board (P14), one of the SEDA representatives on the board (P15), the Agency 
Manager (P21), one of the two Business Development Officers (P6) and the Business 
Coordination Officer (P8).   
 
Figure 2: Change in the structure of the Partnership during ‘late’ phase’ (May – October 2011) 
 
a. Company structure April 2011 – May 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WISE Board of 
Directors (n=6)  
Admin (n=1)  BDO(n=1)  BDO(n=1)  YDC(n=1)  BDC (n=1)  
 Steering group 
(n 3+3=6) 
Agency 
Manager (1) 
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b. Company structure May 2011-October 2011 
 
 
 
 
Procedure 
 
For this ‘late’ phase of the longitudinal study, all 10 participants engaged in individual semi-
structured interviews with the researcher. The interviews were conducted face-to-face (n=6) or 
on the telephone (n=4). The questions asked were open-ended in nature and were the same for all 
participants. As the interviews were semi-structured, the researcher asked additional 
supplementary questions when participants took the discourse in different directions. All 
interviews were recorded for future transcription and analysis. Interviews lasted from 20 minutes 
to 54 minutes in length. The prescribed questions were the same as the questions employed in the 
‘early’ phase, which were constructed from the evaluation requirements of the original funding 
bid and the nine key factors outlined above (Sheard & Kakabadse, 2002). 
 
Analysis 
 
Data 
 
The data collected for analysis in this ‘late’ phase of the research evaluation was 10 semi-
structured interviews conducted by one of the researchers with the participants outlined above. 
One of the researchers also attended (as an observer only) a series of the WISE board and 
steering group meetings held during this ‘late’ phase of the group project. The researchers are 
also engaged in the evaluation of all three employment enhancement programmes delivered by 
the WISE. This combination of data collectors and ‘insider’ experience combined to give the 
researchers a unique perspective on the development of the group partnership, which informed 
the interpretation of the data. 
 
Procedure  
 
The method employed to analyse the 10 transcripts of the participant’s individual semi-structured 
interviews collected for this ‘late’ phase in the research, was ‘Constant Comparative Method’ 
WISE Board of Directors 
(n=5)  
Admin (n=1)  BDO(n=1)  YDC(n=1)  
Steering group (n 
3+3=6) 
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(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Constant Comparative Method (CCM) is an 
iterative procedure designed for the qualitative analysis of text and is based on ‘Grounded 
Theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Constant Comparative Method has been successfully applied 
in previous studies across a wide range of disciplines from social venture creation (Haugh, 2007) 
to music composition strategies (Seddon & O’Neill, 2003) and musical communication (Seddon, 
2004 & 2005). This method of analysis focuses on a process where categories emerge from the 
data via inductive reasoning rather than coding the data according to predetermined categories 
(Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). Constant Comparative Method involves five main stages:  
 
1) Immersion, ‘units of analysis’ are identified;  
2) Categorisation, ‘categories’ emerge from the ‘units of analysis’;  
3) Phenomenological reduction, ‘themes’ emerge from the ‘categories’ and are interpreted 
by the researchers;  
4) Triangulation, support  for researcher interpretations of ‘themes’ is sought in additional 
data;  
5) Interpretation, overall interpretation of findings is conducted in relation to prior research 
and/or theoretical models (McLeod, 1994).  
 
Results 
 
When interpreting the results of the data analysis it should be taken into consideration that during 
this ‘late’ phase of the research (May 2011- October 2011) the Agency Manager was deemed by 
the WISE board not to have successfully completed his probationary period by the end of May 
2011 and was asked to leave the post, which he subsequently agreed to do. The Chair of the 
WISE board (a SEDA representative) became unwell and resigned as a director and the position 
of Chair of the board was taken by one of the remaining two SEDA representatives. Another 
SEDA representative, who had been recently appointed as CEO of SEDA, did attend one WISE 
board meeting at which there was a disagreement between himself and two of the UNI 
representatives. After this disagreement SEDA were represented by the two original 
representatives only.  
 
Analysis of the interviews: 
 
Stage one (i.e. ‘immersion’) revealed 31 units of analysis (e.g. ‘belief in the 3e vision’, ‘lack of 
leadership’, ‘learning experience’ and ‘criticism of the board’). Stage two (i.e. categorisation), 12 
categories emerged from the 31 units of analysis, which were interpreted by the researchers as: 
‘positives’, ‘organisation’, ‘partnership’, ‘failure’, ‘staff’, ‘changes at SEDA’, ‘explanation of 
problems’, ‘the project’, ‘communication’, ‘reflection’, ‘client discontent’ and ‘sustainability. 
Stage three (i.e. phenomenological reduction) five themes emerged from the 12 categories, 
which were interpreted by the researchers as: ‘reasons’, ‘positives’, ‘company structure’, ‘the 
partnership’ and ‘negatives’. A diagrammatic version of this process of analysis is provided for 
further clarification (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 – CCM Analysis at ‘Late’ phase: 
        
Immersion                Categorisation          Phenomenological Reduction 
 
Units of Analysis (31)  Categories A-L (12)          Themes (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NB. The numbers displayed above in Fig. 3 in the ‘categories’ boxes correspond to the relevant units of analysis 
contained in that category. The letters in the ‘themes’ boxes correspond to the relevant category contained in that 
theme. 
 
All participant quotations cited below are taken from units of analysis and serve to exemplify 
specific aspects of the overall themes of: ‘reasons’, ‘positives’, ‘company structure’, ‘the 
partnership’, and ‘negatives’. In order to maintain participant anonymity, participants are 
referred to only by their participant number. In order to provide the context for the participant’s 
perspective, Figure 4 indicates the participant’s number in relation to their position in the 
partnership/company. 
 
 
 
 
A: ‘Positives’ 
 
1,8,12,20,24,26 
B: ‘Organisation’ 
 
4,10,13,21,22,23,28 
C: ‘Partnership’  
 
3,6,19 
 
D: ‘Failure’ 
 
7,25,27 
E: ‘Staff’ 
 
2,16 
G: ‘Explanations of 
problems’ 
9,11 
H: ‘The project’ 
 
14,30 
I: ‘Communication’ 
 
15,18 
J: ‘Reflection’ 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
31 Discernibly 
different ‘Units 
of Analysis’ 
1: ‘Reasons’ 
 
G,H,I,J,L  
2: ‘Positives’ 
A 
3: ‘Company 
structure’ 
B,E 
4: ‘The partnership’ 
C,F 
5: ‘Negatives’ 
D,K 
K: ‘Client 
discontent’ 
 
17 
F: ‘Changes at 
SEDA’ 
29 
L: ‘Sustainability’ 
 
31 
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Figure 4: Key to participant number in relation to position in the company and the partnership 
 
    
 
 
UNI: P1, P12, P13 
SEDA:  P16, P20 
External stakeholder: P9, P17 
WISE staff: P2, P3, P22 
 
Theme 1: ‘Reasons’ 
 
This theme is characterised by participants offering reasons for the direction the WISE took, 
which was basically to complete the funded project without engaging with opportunities to 
develop the company into a sustainable social enterprise. With hindsight participants believed 
the appointment of the original CEO during the ‘early’ phase and the Agency Manager (P21) 
during the ‘middle’ phase were seen as poor appointments because neither proved to have the 
entrepreneurial skills that the transition to sustainability required.   
 
‘The only goals we ended up with were the project based ones. None of the people we 
recruited got to grips with.....I think we did articulate right at the very beginning to CEO 
what the strategic aims were for [the WISE]. When we recruited P21 we set those out as 
well. What we never did was work out the common ground between the two partners; 
SEDA never articulated what they were in it for. We [UNI] did articulate it but I don’t 
think it was a cohesive message…...’ (P1) 
 
‘The problem with [the WISE] has always been management. It was the wrong managers, 
the board choosing the wrong managers and now it’s the board being the wrong 
manager. Because do you know what I mean they’re like not managers at all. The 
problem with P21 was they chose somebody who came into an interview with all the 
theory in the world but no actual commercial experience…’ (P2) 
 
‘In the end what I’ve learned is unsurprisingly it all comes down to the people. You get 
the right people and motivate them in the right way it will happen. If you don’t get the 
WISE Board of 
Directors (n=4): 
P1, P12,  P13,  P16, 
Admin (n=1):  
P3  
BDO (n=1): 
P2 
YDC (n=1): 
 P22 
Steering Group (n=3):  
P1, P9, P12 , P16, P17, 
P20, 
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right people, and 3e as you know proved singularly ineffective at getting the right people, 
it will not work.’ (P12) 
 
There was also a general feeling among board members that they were not able to devote 
sufficient time to the WISE because of pressure of work in other areas. This viewpoint seemed to 
be supported by other members of staff. 
 
‘I should have made a stronger case for this is the only project or the only thing I need to 
be working on; so, too distracted by other things. That was a structural thing I think it 
was the fact that I was employed by the university and had a number of other things on 
and this was just one of a number of things that I was dealing with.’ (P1) 
 
‘No, I mean the change in my role to ***** full-time actually gives me more permission 
to get more involved. Although it has also given me....at the moment I have 4 major 
large-scale commercial projects that I am being asked to manage. And this would....this 
wouldn’t even make.....the WISE wouldn’t make even make the top dozen priorities.’ 
(P12) 
 
‘Yeah, I think that if I had spent more time basically. I sit on one or two boards in various 
forms and guises. I’m not necessarily satisfied with my contribution in any of them. I 
would always use the excuse of time but had I got involved more I think I would have 
hopefully been able to contribute more and again there’s probably a lesson there that 
don’t take on a directorship if you just see it as turning up once every month or two to a 
board meeting.’ (P13) 
 
It is possible that a combination of lack of time on behalf of the directors and the lack of 
entrepreneurial skills of the managers the board appointed contributed to the WISE focusing on 
achieving the funding project targets at the expense of developing a sustainable future for the 
WISE. By the time the company had reached this ‘late’ phase the main focus of attention was 
completing the project with only vague intentions towards future sustainability. 
 
‘I don’t feel that there has been any forward planning for [the WISE] and I think that’s 
probably not helped, it’s always been the funder, the funder hit this figure, hit that figure, 
hit this figure, hit that figure, do this, do that no forward planning for what you are going 
to do after the funding.’   (P3) 
 
‘There is a recognition that it [the WISE] was set up to run two/three projects and that 
effectively was what it was going to do. So there was a kind of satisfying outcome, which 
focused on ensuring that the project targets were met and panicking and worrying and so 
forth when they weren’t. The board meetings were almost exclusively around a 
monitoring of project targets, which from my perspective being rather distant from it was 
kind of difficult and frankly very boring. I certainly didn’t feel as if it was using the 
potential of board members at all.’ (P13) 
 
‘I have got a SEDA role. In fact we are lead partner on the funding contract and so we 
have got contractual obligations to meet, which I have been the lead person with the 
12 
 
responsibility at SEDA to ensure that we meet those. Since May it’s been a very specific 
amount of time that I’ve been allocated to work on the [the WISE] work. The majority of 
my time has been on the funding programme.’ (P16) 
 
The reoccurring problems around poor communication were again cited as a major contributory 
factor in the company not moving forward towards sustainability. This once again involved 
inadequate communication between board members and between the board, partners and the 
company staff. 
 
‘Another example is that the communication between the board, they obviously know, 
they’ve known for a long time probably that things were not going to carry on much 
longer because they haven’t got the money and they aren’t doing anything to make it 
carry on so they must have known that but our contract ends on September.’ (P2) 
 
‘The only other thing of note is that P16 now rings me up direct and she and I have been 
discussing the business and that’s it. Everybody else is out of the loop. But it is 
frustrating because when I ask questions like just how much money is there in the bank? 
How much money has [the WISE] got? It is somewhere between £10-25,000 but you 
know you could accept £15,000 difference if you are talking about £1m but when you are 
talking at that level it’s such a large difference.’ (P12) 
 
‘There were a number of issues as well that perhaps could have been ironed out earlier 
on that were to some extent to do with the lack of communication between [the WISE] 
and ourselves [external stakeholders]. I think that there was a need for clearer contracts 
in whatever form between the organisations. I think that it would have been easier if it 
was all managed by one organisation but on the other hand I know that there were also 
some issues of lack of communication and effective working within the organisation so I 
don’t think it is necessarily an issue about having different partners involved.’ (P17) 
 
The above citations from the units of analysis in the theme ‘reasons’ reveal the participants’ 
thoughts on why the partnership and company focused on achieving funder outputs at the 
expense of future sustainability and some of the problems that contributed to the company focus. 
There is a sense of missed opportunity here, which is articulated by the following participant’s 
comment: 
 
‘I think there were big opportunities for [the WISE] to become sustainable and make its 
way independently following the programme but I think they have not been acted upon 
for a number of reasons. You know the board, the leader, the manager going, probably 
not having the right person in place. I think there’s been opportunities missed and I think 
it will be a shame, if this divide between SEDA and UNI, if it all just has been for 
nothing. I think it has been a real shame; we shall see. I guess in the next couple of weeks 
it will all become clear as to what happens. Whether the university decides it wants to 
take it on. Yeah I think it’s a real shame.’ (P20) 
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Theme 2: ‘Positives’ 
 
Although the Partnership was moving towards dissolution towards the end of this ‘late’ phase the 
participants in this evaluation research expressed their continuing belief in the ‘vision’ of WISE 
and described some positive outcomes. The employment enhancement programmes the WISE 
delivered demonstrated some positive outcomes, which were recorded and reported in their 
evaluation reports.  
 
‘If I look at the reason [the WISE] was set up, its vision, what it wanted to do, I still 
believe there’s a role for such an organisation. We should have been in the position now 
to be making the most of it so I still genuinely believe that the ethos the vision the purpose 
of [the WISE] is still there.’ (P1) 
 
‘I think the overall view of helping the community and doing the whole social enterprise 
thing is still there.’ (P3) 
 
‘I don’t think our purpose has changed it’s just our ability to do it. We’ve had a few 
glitches really. I don’t think the purpose has altered at all what we are trying to achieve 
and our route to it has not necessarily been the clearest or the easiest.’ (P16) 
 
Some individuals felt the whole process was a learning experience and that there was some 
success because the project contracts had been completed. 
 
‘My advice to anybody who wanted to set up a social enterprise would be don’t do it in 
the way we did it. Start off with who are your customers? What are your products and 
services? What is the business model? Will it work? Have the guts to say good idea but 
we can’t make it work. Then work out who’s going to pay for it and ideally, do it on a 
trading model rather than this contract because contracts influence behaviour so 
strongly that they subsume everything. You can run a business, a commercial business 
and have contracts as part of that but as soon as it becomes the main part then you cease 
to do the business part of it.’ (P12) 
 
‘What it has enabled me as an individual to think through is that I actually have clarified 
further my notion of what a social enterprise is, or should be rather than is. I wouldn’t 
want to be party to another social enterprise that was effectively a project focused 
business but would prefer a truly commercial social enterprise, if that is not a 
contradiction in terms.’ (P13) 
 
 ‘From a contract point of view, I think the delivery and everything that [the WISE] is 
doing down there they’ve actually achieved the entire contract that they were contracted 
to do. And the one remaining contract [that] at the moment is in place, the funders are 
quite happy with the direction and are actually quite pleased with some of the results and 
the direction that it is going in.’ (P16) 
 
Two of the UNI representatives felt there was a WISE brand there to salvage. This idea was to 
develop the Graduate programme from UNI without SEDA being involved.  
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‘I don’t want the [the WISE] brand to go. I still think there’s something there but I think 
it’s more a case of let’s take a couple of steps back before we move forward on it. SEDA 
couldn’t make their mind up. We knew as a university what we wanted to do with it, 
which was actually we wanted to bring it in house take control of it redirect it push it out 
as something slightly different.’ (P1) 
 
‘My specific goal now is to turn [the WISE] into a sustainable trading social enterprise 
helping unemployed people get jobs. The changes are very much more direct involvement 
in developing things that the business can do.’ (P12) 
  
Theme 3: ‘Company structure’ 
 
This theme is characterised by the participant’s perceptions of how changes in the company 
structure during this ‘late’ phase impacted on the management and direction of the company. At 
the beginning of this ‘late’ phase the Agency Manager (P21) left the company and no 
replacement was sought by the WISE board. There were only three remaining members of staff 
at the WISE (P2, P3 & P22). A new CEO was appointed to run SEDA (when referred to by 
participants during the interviews his name is changed to RM to protect his anonymity), which 
resulted in major personnel changes at SEDA (P16 & P20 were made redundant). RM replaced 
P14 as a director of the WISE at a subsequent WISE board meeting during which there was a 
major disagreement between certain individuals from the main partners (SEDA and UNI), which 
called into question the future of the Partnership. A period of indecision followed the boardroom 
disagreement, which was followed by a period during which a decision was taken to complete 
the funding programme, cease trading, make the remaining three members of the WISE staff 
redundant, dissolve the partnership and transfer the WISE brand to UNI. 
 
‘SEDA has imploded to a large extent, RM’s come in he’s hacked of the [SEDA] staff. 
Most of the old guard have left so they are down to two members of staff now and looking 
to merge with [national social enterprise agency].’ (P1) 
 
The WISE had no manager in place, which meant managerial duties tended to be split between 
WISE board members, partnership members and the WISE administrator, which was perceived a 
 less than perfect situation by the WISE staff. 
 
‘It’s been a bit hard really. Now at the present time we have got two completely different 
personalities because obviously there’s only myself and two others P2 and P22 within the 
team. So, now we’ve got two completely different personalities, which is quite strange 
because when P21 was in place he liked to micro-manage everybody and know exactly 
what everybody was doing and tell them exactly what they have got to do. Nobody liked 
that and now I’ve realised you can see that one [member of staff] really needs that 
micro-managing and the other one is the obvious “I just want to get on with my job” 
[type] and “I know what I’m doing and leave me alone”. So that’s been a bit.....’(P3). 
 
A lack of purpose and leadership was perceived by the remaining WISE staff and morale was 
negatively affected. 
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‘At the minute there is no purpose. We haven’t got a purpose our only job is to finish our 
funding contract, which we are not doing very successfully. The purpose of helping 
people and our project has disappeared so I don’t see a purpose anymore. I am working 
off my own steam. I haven’t got any boss really.’ (P2) 
 
 ‘In my life it is all to do with me but I stay because my morale is down as low as it gets 
basically I’ve thought about putting in my resignation; it kind of rubs off you know. There 
isn’t any leadership. SEDA appear to be trying to do a little bit of leadership but it’s 
minimal.’ (P22) 
 
‘I think the board have been inhibiting the whole way along. If you look back at the 
[WISE] journey, from the beginning the board have been the problem the whole way 
through.’ (P2) 
 
‘I sometimes sit there and say is it really my decision to make? Have I done this right? 
Should I be doing this? But obviously, the board members haven’t really got time to sit 
there and look at every pernickety thing that comes up and decide what we are going to 
do.’ (P3) 
 
This lack of leadership was also recognised by board and partnership members. 
 
‘It [the WISE] didn’t have the leadership or management capable of taking it beyond that 
[a funded project] and to be fair probably the board on both sides [SEDA and UNI] 
wasn’t determined enough to make sure that it was a success in its own right.’ (P13) 
 
 ‘I feel like I have become more of a leader to some extent within [the WISE] with the 
reduction in staff certainly to the levels they are now. Although P16 is coming down who 
is my boss but I don’t think things have changed between us kind of thing. I think I 
shouldn’t be in a position where I’m leading but I find myself in that position I think 
sometimes.’ (P20) 
 
When P21 left the company, an attempt was made by the WISE board to include the WISE staff 
in future planning, which was largely unsuccessful. 
 
‘I did a business plan towards what would happen. I did it and then nothing happened, 
the board just did nothing like they are too busy doing their own things really to be 
interested in 3e. So it’s like they come up with all these ideas and then you try and do 
what they want and then it’s like that’s forgotten about…’ (P2) 
 
Communication between the WISE board and the staff regarding the future of the company was 
poor because of the period of indecision following the disagreement between the main partners. 
 
‘I think communication to the staff and the future and what’s happening we’ve not been 
as open with the staff because we didn’t have a plan and we wanted to wait until we had 
a firm plan before we told them what was happening. I think that meant that we have 
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informed them quite late, which is obviously not very good for their, not very good for 
their morale.’ (P16) 
 
It was discovered during this period that the funder’s end of programme reportables were once 
again not being collected correctly and a period of crisis management followed in an attempt to 
rectify this situation. 
 
 ‘Most of the time the organisation, the people working in it were in catch-up mode 
attempting to meet project objectives and always a little bit behind and their first priority 
was to make five phone calls to would be beneficiaries rather than talk about the future of 
the business and you can kind of understand that.’ (P13) 
 
‘It’s reverted back to what it was probably about a year ago now, which is quite strange 
how its cycle has repeated itself. I think if we had collected information nearer to when 
they finished it might have been more productive.’ (P20) 
 
Members of the WISE board and representatives of the other partners felt the changes in the 
company structure made a significant contribution to the lack of clarity of purpose throughout 
the partnership that resulted in sustainability being neglected in favour of focusing on the 
completion of the funding programme. 
 
‘But that was all the way through there was never really you know we’d have 
conversations about health and safety procedures for a company for a board that didn’t 
determine what the company strategy was, didn’t set itself targets for longevity growth, 
didn’t clarify commercial opportunities and produce targets and timing and necessary 
responsibilities and accountabilities for ensuring they were going to be taken through. A 
complete inability to manage effectively let alone lead just the normal sort of tenets of 
good people in resource management weren’t ever really in place.’ (P13) 
 
‘We wanted to not only achieve our contract we also wanted to look for new 
opportunities to bring income into the organisation. We also wanted the manager to be 
able to manage the current staff team in both of those. So, it’s leading the organisation 
then and taking it forward in the direction but also taking the staff with it and enabling 
them to go down that line.’ (P16) 
 
 ‘I think it is an issue about being clear about roles and responsibilities and having some 
effective management and direction from somewhere that brings all those partners and 
activities together. And I think that that was always lacking actually.’ (P17) 
 
‘I think having less staff has changed things I think you know and not having a leader as 
such. And because there’s a big divide in the board, the staff don’t really know where to 
go and where they are getting their direction from.’ (P20) 
 
The overall management situation was summarised by one of the WISE board members: 
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‘It’s the classic case of go into it without a clear idea of what it is and what the objectives 
are, engage the processes and get bogged down with the nitty-gritty and wonder after a 
period of time why it’s not going anywhere. Alice in wonderland when you come to the 
fork in the road and she asks “Which way do I go?” and the March Hare says something 
like “Well where do you want to get to?” and she says “Well I don’t really know” and he 
says “Well it doesn’t matter which way you go then does it?” [Laughs]’ (P13) 
 
Theme 4: ‘The partnership’ 
 
During this ‘late’ phase there was a change in the management structure of SEDA, which 
impacted on the Partnership. SEDA appointed a new CEO (RM) who demonstrated a desire to 
take SEDA in a different direction. His appointment also resulted in two of the SEDA staff who 
were directly involved in the WISE being made redundant (P16 & P20). RM’s personality and 
management style coupled with a specific clash between him and one of the university directors 
(P12) was cited by many participants as a significant factor in a deepening conflict between 
SEDA and UNI, which ultimately led to the dissolution of the Partnership and the company 
being made dormant. 
 
‘At SEDA they took on a new CEO [RM] who fell out big time with P12. They had a 
stand up row and we never really got past that. RM actually came in with the intention 
that he wanted [the WISE] to fold. He couldn’t see the point he couldn’t see the purpose. 
It was a total distraction but I think more importantly what has happened is he also saw 
that there was a funding stream that he was having to share with the university to keep 
[the WISE] going. If he could end that relationship the funding stream would then go into 
SEDA’ (P1) 
 
‘When I entered the room I could tell that there was.....there had been something of a 
conversation before and it was P12. And I know extremely well his [P12] ability to both 
take offense and give offense with someone who I suspect was a very similar character. 
And I learned afterwards that they [P12 & RM] had had quite a serious set to but it was 
reasonably obvious beforehand. That was a seminal moment.’ (P13)   
  
‘I think especially in the last month or two because we’ve had some tensions at board 
between [UNI and SEDA] and we’ve struggled to get certain decisions and agreement on 
the way forward for [the WISE]. I’ve been conscious that our own organisation [SEDA] 
is perhaps heading in a different direction priority wise.’ (P16)   
 
‘We have in the last three months had a new chief executive start at SEDA. Things have 
definitely in the last 3 months got worse between SEDA and the university. And I think 
that’s due to the involvement of our new boss [RM]. He sees a very different view of the 
whole programme and where SEDA are going in its future to where perhaps the old 
SEDA how we were before, how we perceived where we were going and the work we 
were doing.’ (P20) 
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The strained relationship between the two major partners had a significant impact on the future 
of the Partnership that was perceived as detrimental to the company by the remaining staff at the 
WISE. 
 
‘SEDA and the university don’t like each other anymore. So they’re not focussed on [the 
WISE] at all they’re just focused on their own things. There’s no strategy they are not 
communicating any strategy because there is none and that’s it.’ (P2) 
 
‘SEDA and the university have had a bit of a falling out. So there’s talk of SEDA not 
being interested in [the WISE] after the funded programme. So that is really up in the 
air.’ (P3)  
 
Participants at all levels of the business expressed doubts about the seriousness and commitment 
to sustainability demonstrated by members of the Partnership. 
 
‘I think they [SEDA and UNI] are the same they see it as like a learning thing. I was in a 
board meeting and they were talking and they said like “Oh this could have been done 
anywhere we didn’t have to have a whole new company we could have put it in as a side 
part of this company and it’s all about the learning”. It’s real life; it’s a real business 
[that] it’s supposed to be taking forward. It shouldn’t be really a little experiment. It 
should have been like an actual venture kind of thing and it was really an experiment I 
think and it just went wrong.’ (P2) 
 
‘I think we were all basically playing at it. That’s clearly got to stop, which is why.....in 
some ways I think it is quite liberating that the project is over because now we can run 
it....and I’ve no intention of applying for a grant unless somebody gives it to us on a 
plate. We run it as a business and it survives or fails as a business, which in some ways 
it’s harder than.....but it’s different and as I say I do find it quite liberating.’ (P12)  
 
P1 expressed doubts about the nature of partnerships between the university involved in the 
partnership, universities in general and other organisations in relation to social enterprise. 
 
‘I believe that the university cannot deliver on a social enterprise agenda on its own. I 
think it needs to forge partnerships with others but what it is not good at is developing 
partnerships and staying with them for the long haul. So whilst the relationship with 
SEDA hasn’t worked out there are many other partnership relationships that do not work 
with the university. I wouldn’t want SEDA to be seen in isolation; that there was 
something fundamentally wrong with that relationship. I think the problem is we come to 
the table undervaluing the potential of partnership working. We do not value our 
partners as an institution and on many occasions ride roughshod over them.’ (P1) 
 
Theme 5: ‘Negatives’ 
 
This theme characterises the feelings expressed by some of the participants in relation to the 
dissolution of the Partnership and the cessation or making dormant of the original WISE. There 
was some overall optimism expressed that the company could be continued in a different guise 
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under the sole ownership of the university. However, many of the partners expressed negative 
feelings towards what they sometimes referred to as the ‘experiment’, which most considered a 
failure. The opinion expressed by one participant was that the skills required to complete a 
funded project differ so significantly with those required to establish a sustainable social 
enterprise it makes attempting to do both concurrently an impossible task. 
 
‘I suppose me being me, the fact that after all this work there is nothing to show for it, 
there’s a failure. By the time we actually got to addressing what we needed to address, it 
was too big a problem. I think we made a good fist of it but...... So, I think if the overall 
objective was to have a functioning social enterprise that was delivering employability 
programmes for those target groups to make a significant contribution to the economic 
and social well-being of the county; it failed. I failed in that.’ (P1) 
 
‘When we met for the second interview [the ‘middle’ phase] the purpose of [the WISE] 
was still to deliver the project, the funded project. In my view [the WISE] has semi-failed 
to deliver that project effectively and semi-failed to set itself up as a business. I am 
increasingly of the view that the skills needed to deliver a project and the skills needed to 
set-up and run a commercial business are so different as I think we always thought they 
were but this has highlighted it.’ (P12) 
 
 ‘I’m sure they have got priorities in other areas but I think [the WISE] was still about 
looking beyond the initial funding. It didn’t do anything along those [sustainability] lines 
from what I understand.’ (P9) 
 
Responsibility for the failure of the WISE was perceived by partners to be a combination of poor 
management, poor staff and overly ambitious aspirations.  
 
‘I think the directors collectively didn’t succeed, which is a way of saying we failed I 
suppose. Because once P1 stopped being acting CEO frankly the thing didn’t progress. I 
am disappointed with the performance of the company and some of the individuals in it. It 
seems to me they didn’t get so many of the basics right and we as directors, we did pick 
up that it wasn’t being addressed and we did say this should happen but we were unable 
or unwilling to force it to happen.’ (P12) 
 
‘The fact that the company, the social enterprise, didn’t reach anything like the ambitious 
objectives that I would have had for it; my association with it was not particularly 
positive. Had we had a commercially running social enterprise that was successful, stood 
on its own feet, engaged in business outside of projects that had excellent PR for the 
university and for itself, did a lot of social good that was measureable in some shape or 
form, it would have been great personally to have been associated with that. As it is; it is 
kind of neutral.’ (P13) 
 
One of the three remaining members of the WISE staff expressed his feelings of personal 
responsibility and the ‘team’ responsibility. 
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‘I don’t know. I’ve never lied to anyone. When I came in and had an interview for this job 
I told everyone exactly what I’ve done before and they took me on. I feel like I...obviously 
[had] a big role in the failure of [the WISE] obviously. What could I have done better? 
Well, because I’m part of it, I’m in it, I’m a section of it so, I can’t blame anyone else. 
The only person I can blame for any sort of failure is myself. I’m not saying I could have 
made the company or broke the company on my own but I was definitely a player in it.’ 
(P22) 
 
Discussion 
 
Analysis and interpretation of the emergent themes demonstrates that there was a level of 
unanimity among the participants in this research evaluation, at both partnership and the WISE 
staff level, surrounding the ‘reasons’ problems arose for the partnership and the company. 
Participants expressed the view that these problems were directly linked to poor recruitment 
especially at management level; the inability of directors to establish effective partnership and to 
devote sufficient time to focus on the development of the company into a sustainable social 
enterprise; poor communication at all levels; the sustained inability on behalf of the WISE staff 
to effectively collect the required funder’s ‘reportables’ and a lack of entrepreneurial activity on 
behalf of past CEOs and the final Agency Manager. However, there were some perceived 
‘positives’. In spite of the problems identified above and the inevitable dissolution of the 
Partnership, partner representatives displayed a continuing belief in the ‘vision’ of the WISE and 
referred to the positive programme outcomes identified in the evaluation reports prepared for the 
three employment enhancement programmes. Partners also believed that they had been involved 
in an ‘experiment’, which had resulted in a learning experience. The main learning outcome for 
partners engaged in the ‘experiment’, which was identified as testing the feasibility of 
developing a social enterprise from a funded project, was that the skills required to complete a 
funded project and develop a social enterprise were significantly different and at times 
incompatible with each other.  
 
There were a number of changes at partner level. P14 [a SEDA representative] ceased to be chair 
of the WISE board of directors through ill health. The chair was taken over by P15 [a SEDA 
representative]. SEDA appointed a new CEO [RM] and P16 and P20 were made redundant. 
Although there were no changes in personnel representing the university, P1 and P12’s roles at 
the university changed. P1 resigned from the university and was employed by a UK company 
then seconded back to the university and P12 changed university schools and his role within the 
university changed accordingly. Once the Agency Manager left and was not replaced, the staff at 
the WISE remained the same during this ‘late’ phase [i.e. three employees]. These changes to 
‘the company structure’ created a consistently volatile situation, which was not conducive to 
working environment stability, entrepreneurial management and effective collaboration. 
Additionally, the critical personnel change at SEDA [i.e. the appointment of a new CEO (RM)] 
was reported as being directly responsible for the ultimate breakdown and dissolution of ‘the 
Partnership’. This breakdown precipitated a further deterioration in communication between the 
partners and between the WISE board and its staff. The company then went through a period 
where it drifted with no real sense of direction or effective leadership. There was also evidence 
of a lack of commonality of aspiration and purpose between the two main partners [SEDA and 
UNI], which impacted negatively on the performance of the company.  
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The WISE staff had three different leaders in the space of 18 months, the original CEO, the 
acting CEO and the Agency Manager, which often left the staff disorientated and without clear 
direction. At the beginning of this ‘late’ phase, the outgoing Agency Manager’s restructure of the 
company resulted in a staff team of three individuals without a designated manager. A major 
disagreement between individuals in the Partnership resulted in a period of partner indecision 
immediately following the ‘resignation’ of the Agency Manager, which left the company without 
direction. This period of indecision resulted in poor staff morale and contributed to the company 
ceasing to operate and being made ‘dormant’.   
 
As with the ‘early’ and ‘middle’ phase evaluations, if the evidence of the research evaluation 
from this ‘late’ phase is triangulated with the Sheard & Kakabadse (2002) model proposed 
earlier in this report, it can be argued that the WISE is no longer locked into the 
‘Norming/Storming Cycle’ section of the model (please see Figure 1) but has taken a path not 
offered in the model [i.e. complete breakdown]. This finding could provide evidence to propose 
an additional option within the model. By examining the basic elements of task, individual, 
group and environment in relation to their nine key contributory factors it can be argued that 
during this ‘late’ phase of the research evaluation, the partnership and the WISE staff are still 
operating as a ‘loose group’ and not yet performing as an ‘effective team’ (please see Figure 1).  
 
Task 
 
For the basic element ‘task’ the key factors are ‘having clearly defined goals’ and ‘priorities’. In 
an effective team, these factors are understood by all and there is cohesive team alignment. At 
this ‘late’ phase the staff still did not feel they had clearly defined goals, especially in relation to 
addressing issues of sustainability. Priorities were again focused on achieving the funder’s 
outputs, which continued to inhibit the initiation of engagement in entrepreneurial activities 
enabling the company to establish a marketable product. There was also evidence that the 
Partnership (i.e. SEDA and UNI) had still not clearly defined their goals and had decided to 
dissolve the Partnership.    
 
Individual 
 
For the basic element ‘individual’, the key factors are ‘roles and responsibilities’ and ‘self-
awareness’. In an effective team, roles and responsibilities are agreed and understood by 
individuals and the social system is established and accepted. During this ‘late’ phase the 
resignation of the Agency Manager and restructure of the company failed to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of the staff. The Partnership had undergone changes that modified the roles and 
responsibilities of individuals within the Partnership, which impacted on their self-awareness and 
had a negative impact on the company. The lack of direction and leadership meant that the social 
system was still not established and accepted by members of staff who became completely 
demoralised.  
 
Group 
 
For the basic element ‘group’, the key factors are ‘leadership’, ‘dynamics’ and ‘communication’. 
In an effective team, leadership should be ‘catalytic’ and the social system ‘established and 
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accepted’. During this ‘late’ phase there was a perceived lack of leadership from the board. The 
dynamic within the board deteriorated as did the dynamic between the board and staff members. 
For a period following the dispute between board members, communication between the board 
members themselves and between the board and the staff was suspended as the board members 
sought to find a way forward for the company.  
 
Environment 
 
For the basic element ‘environment’, the key factors are ‘infrastructure’ and ‘context’. In an 
effective team the ‘infrastructure’ should be stable with support from organisational 
infrastructure. The ‘late’ phase was characterised by volatility of infrastructure and context, 
which created poor stability and reduced the support for staff.  Leadership was absent for the 
period following the ‘resignation’ of the Agency Manager and the subsequent breakdown of the 
Partnership.  
 
It was argued in the ‘early’ and ‘middle’ phase reports there was evidence that the ‘team’ (i.e 
SEDA and UNI) had not reached the ‘performing’ stage in the ‘Integrated Team Development 
Framework’ proposed by Sheard & Kakabadse (2002). At the end of this ‘late’ phase the 
Partnership was dissolved and the company made dormant pending a decision by the university 
to re-launch the company under a different guise without the other partners being involved. 
During this ‘experiment’ the team failed to progress from the ‘norming/storming cycle’ to the 
‘performing’ stage. 
 
Summary  
 
The results of this research study highlight the difficulty of establishing and developing a 
sustainable WISE utilising publicly contracted finance. It also highlights the added difficulties of 
doing so within an institutional partnership. The WISE developed in the collaboration between 
UNI and SEDA ultimately succeeded in meeting its contractual requirements to the funder, but 
in essence failed because it did not achieve sustainability and is currently a dormant company. 
This failure to achieve sustainability was the result of poor communication between the 
institutional partners both strategically and also operationally at board and steering group level. 
This lack of direction filtered down to the CEOs employed and were exacerbated by their 
individual poor performance. This then led to a lack of focus and direction amongst the staff on 
the ‘frontline’ that ultimately led to the failure of the WISE to achieve sustainability and meant 
that the WISE staff were locked in a cycle of ‘storming/norming’. This lack of direction 
contributed to operational errors and problems, chief amongst which was an inability to 
satisfactorily complete basic reportables for the funding body. This led to crises that had to be 
continually managed and meant that the staff were consistently ‘firefighting’ when they should 
have been focusing on achieving sustainability. Whilst further research is required this research 
study demonstrates the problems inherent in social enterprise start-ups involving different 
institutional partners that are funded through public contracts. 
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